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I. INTRODUCTION
Canada and the United States have the largest bilateral
trade relationship in the world.' However, over the past decade,
trade remedy laws, in particular antidumping duties (ADDs),
countervailing duties (CVDs), and safeguard actions, have sub-
stantially impeded the free flow of goods between the two mar-
kets. ADDs purportedly offset adverse effects on a domestic
industry which result from foreign firms engaging in interna-
tional price discrimination. In contrast, CVDs are aimed at un-
fair subsidization of foreign firms by their own governments.
Safeguard actions permit temporary relief from unexpected im-
port surges resulting from prior trade concessions.
As reflected in Figure 1, worldwide antidumping cases have
increased dramatically since 1990 with many countries adopting
antidumping regimes for the first time. In addition, as reflected
in Figure 2, the United States is now a principal defendant.
With the decline in tariffs over successive rounds of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),2 antidumping actions
have now become the remedy of choice for import-impacted do-
mestic industries. 3 In contrast, countervailing duty actions re-
main almost the exclusive preserve of the United States, while
safeguard actions under Article XIX of the GATT, 4 or Chapter
11 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA),5
are relatively rare.
One of Canada's main goals during the negotiation of the
FTA was the attainment of more secure and predictable access
to the U.S. market. Similarly, Canadian negotiators sought to
increase access to continental markets through the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).6 To an important degree,
more secure and predictable access is predicated on obtaining
1. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at ch. II, pt. II.1, on file with
author).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October
30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (current version
in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 4 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS (1969)) [hereinafter GATr].
3. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 1, at ch. I, pt. 11.3.
4. GATT, supra note 2.
5. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, 27 I.L.M.
281 [hereinafter FTAI.
6. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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Figure 1: Antidumping Cases Filed
(Non-US GATT Signatories)
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Note: The figure depicts the total number of antidumping cases reported to the
GATT Committee on Antidumping Practices minus the number reported by the
United States. Only signatories to the antidumping code within the GATT are re-
quired to file such reports, and many countries (including many GATT Contracting
Parties) are not signatories. In addition, some signatories (e.g., the European
Union) do not report some cases filed against non-signatories. The figures presented
thus represent a lower bound on the total number of antidumping cases filed outside
the United States. Sources: For 1980 through 1988, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE USE OF THE GATT ANTIDUMPING CODE 16 (July
1990); for 1989 through 1993, compilations based on GATT reports.
Figure 2: Targets of Antidumping Cases
January 1989 - June 1993
United
States
Korea Taiwan BrazilChina
Source: Compilations from GATT reports.
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relief from other countries applying trade remedy laws.7 The
uncertainty and unpredictability surrounding the invocation
and application of these laws significantly increases what might
be called "border risk," along with other factors such as uncer-
tain application of rules of origin and volatile exchange rates.
For firms or investors contemplating the option of either produc-
ing in Canada and exporting into the United States, or produc-
ing in the larger U.S. market and exporting to the smaller
Canadian market, this asymmetric border risk may significantly
influence decisions which, in most cases, would be adverse to the
interests of Canada.
Although neither the FTA nor NAFTA achieves the elimina-
tion of trade remedy laws, these agreements represent positive
steps toward disciplining the use of trade remedy laws between
the two countries. The FTA introduced some procedural innova-
tions, principally the provisional Chapter 19 binational panel re-
view process for final ADD and CVD determinations.8 These
innovations, which NAFTA makes permanent, have already had
a significant effect in ameliorating certain features of the trade
remedy process, but they leave the substance of each country's
trade remedy law regimes untouched. The Chapter 19 experi-
ence, therefore, is worth briefly reviewing. 9
First, the initiation rate for new ADD and CVD actions has
not significantly decreased, and indeed may have increased,
since the FTA commenced on January 1, 1989. From 1980 to
1988, U.S. producers initiated twenty-two ADD actions and
eleven CVD actions against Canadian exporters, whereas be-
tween 1989 and 1993, twelve ADD actions and six CVD actions
were initiated. 10 From 1980 to 1988, Canadian producers initi-
ated fifty ADD actions and one CVD action against U.S. export-
ers, whereas between 1989 and 1993, twenty-three ADD actions
7. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, CAN. DEP'T OF Ex-
TERNAL AFFAIRS, THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 267 (1987). In the
Canadian government's official version of the FTA, the preface to Chapter 19
states that "[t]he goal of any new regime ... will be to obviate the need for
border remedies, as are now sanctioned by the GATT Antidumping and Subsi-
dies Codes, for example, by developing new rules on subsidy practices and rely-
ing on domestic competition law." Id. at 268.
8. FTA, supra note 5, art. 1904.
9. The following statistics and details are drawn from MICHAEL J. TREBIL-
COCK ET AL., ONTARIO DEP'T OF INTERGOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. TRADE REMEDY
LAwS AND THE ISSUE OF MARKET ACCESS: A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF CANA-
DIAN PROTECTIONS UNDER THE GATT, THE FTA AND NAFTA 48-52 (1994) [here-
inafter MARKET ACCESS].
10. Id. at 49.
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and no CVD actions have been initiated. These figures suggest
that the existence of the binational panel review process has had
little or no deterrent effect on the initiation of trade remedy
actions.11
Second, as of the end of 1993, there were forty-nine requests
for binational panel reviews. Thirty of the forty-nine requests
related to panel review of U.S. agency determinations: eighteen
to investigations initiated prior to 1989, and twelve to investiga-
tions initiated after the FTA. Nineteen of the forty-nine re-
quests related to panel review of Canadian agency
determinations, and only two to investigations commenced prior
to the FTA. Article 1905 of the FTA provides that the binational
panel review process shall apply only prospectively to final de-
terminations made after the FTA comes into force. 12 This, how-
ever, still embraces actions initiated, but not determined, before
this date. Apparently, as a matter of course, exporters now ap-
peal to binational panels almost all adverse final determinations
by an agency of the other country.
Third, there have been twenty-three Chapter 19 cases re-
sulting in a panel opinion to date. Seventeen of the twenty-
three related to U.S. agency determinations, and twelve in-
volved panel remands to the originating agency. Six related to
Canadian agency determinations, and five involved panel re-
mands to the originating agency. This pattern suggests a high
level of panel intervention in agency determinations. All re-
mands entail curtailing the expansive application of trade rem-
edy laws by domestic agencies.
Fourth, a binational panel under Chapter 19 is limited to
remanding decisions to the originating agency and is not able to
substitute its own decision. Therefore, the agency's response on
remand is of critical importance. This response, however, is sub-
ject to review by the panel that initially reviewed the agency's
determinations. Of the twelve U.S. cases remanded by panels,
eight involved more than one panel remand. Of the five Cana-
dian cases remanded by panels, none involved more than one
panel remand.
11. However, other evidence suggests an inverse relationship between ini-
tiation rates (at least for ADDs) and the state of the economy. Susan Hutton &
Michael J. Trebilcock, An Empirical Study of the Application of Canadian An-
tidumping Laws: A Search for Normative Rationales, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 123,
141-42 (June 1990). The early 1990s recession in the United States and Can-
ada may also explain the relatively unaffected initiation rate.
12. FTA, supra note 5.
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Fifth, from the date of a panel request, there is a 315-day
target for a final decision.13 Although this figure has largely
been met, the average number of days from panel request to fi-
nal disposition has been 459 days, reflecting the complexity of
the remand process. On the other hand, the more protracted
cases, like pork, swine, and softwood lumber, have often been of
considerable importance to Canada.
Sixth, while we do not have any systematic evidence of the
cost of the binational panel review process, it appears to be very
costly for the participants. This is especially true of private ex-
porter interests that typically initiate requests for panel re-
views. These private exporters must effectively assume the
carriage of the application for review, face the possibility of do-
mestic agencies reopening aspects of their proceedings to elicit
new evidence in response to panel remands, and face the possi-
bility of further panel reviews of new agency determinations.
Seventh, the Extraordinary Challenge Procedure 14 has been
sparingly invoked. In the cases of pork and swine, the United
States has challenged panel decisions but in both cases the Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committee has peremptorily dismissed
the challenge.
Eighth, the volume of binational panel review requests is
clearly straining the institutional capacity of the process.' 5 The
panels engaged in the currently active cases involve eighty pan-
elists. Given panels of five members and national rosters of
twenty-five members each,16 this number is well in excess of the
number on the two countries' rosters. These figures imply that
the search for qualified, available, independent and non-con-
flicted panelists, who are ad hoc appointees typically with other
full-time commitments, may present increasingly critical
problems.
Several implications emerge from this analysis of the Chap-
ter 19 experience to date. First, the binational panels are clearly
exerting a significant disciplining influence on domestic agency
determinations. Second, the complexities and delays inherent in
the remand process warrant consideration of an extension of the
panels' powers to include the ability, as with other appellate
bodies, to substitute their own decisions for those of a domestic
13. Id. art. 1904(14).
14. Id. Annex 1904.13.
15. There have been 49 requests for binational panel review, with 16 cases
outstanding. MARKET ACCESS, supra note 9, at 52.
16. FTA, supra note 5, Annex 1901.2.
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agency where further inquiry or analysis by the agency is not
warranted. Third, to address the increasingly critical problem of
the scarcity of qualified panelists, consideration needs to be
given to constituting a permanent full-time binational roster of
panelists. For instance, a panel could consist of fifteen members
serving for fixed terms, terminable only for cause to be deter-
mined by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee, from which
the parties would be required to choose two panelists. The
chairperson could be chosen from the roster by agreement of the
nominated panelists or otherwise by lot from other panelists on
the roster.
The unresolved question is whether and to what degree fur-
ther trade liberalization will be promoted through reform of the
trade remedy law regime. Under Articles 1906 and 1907 of the
FTA, a Working Group was to be established to develop a substi-
tute system of rules for ADDs and CVDs over the first five to
seven years of the agreement. 17 After seven years, in the ab-
sence of an agreement on a new regime, either Party could can-
cel the whole FTA on six months notice.' 8 Under Article 1504 of
NAFTA, within five years of the date of entry into force of the
agreement, a Working Group, comprising representatives of
each party, is to report to the Trilateral Free Trade Commission
on the relationship between competition laws and policies and
trade in the free trade area. 19 Under Article 1907 of NAFTA,
the parties agree to consult on developing more effective rules
concerning government subsidization and transborder pricing
practices. 20 No time limit is placed on the latter consultations
and no consequences are stipulated in the event of failure to
agree on a new regime.2 ' However, under a trilateral side ac-
cord, endorsed by the Canadian government in December 1993,
a Working Group is to report within two years on solutions for
reducing the possibility of disputes concerning the issues of sub-
sidies, dumping and the operation of trade remedy laws.2 2
The remainder of this Article focuses on the problems inher-
ent in the substance of trade remedy laws in the bilateral con-
text, and a set of reform proposals is advanced. Consideration is
also given to the applicability of the suggested reforms to the
17. Id. arts. 1906 and 1907.
18. Id. art. 1906.
19. NAFTA, supra note 6.
20. Id. art. 1907(2)(b).
21. Id.
22. See Canadian Government to Implement NAFTA After Receiving Assur-
ances on Concerns, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2051 (Dec. 8, 1993).
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trilateral context. Reform of the various trade remedy laws can-
not be sensibly pursued in isolation from one another, because of
the high degree of substitutability among these remedies.
23
Thus, our proposals reflect an integrated approach to all the ma-
jor trade remedy laws.
II. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT TRADE
REMEDY LAW REGIME
A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL TRADE THEORY
A compelling economic case for increasing freedom of con-
tract through reform of the existing ADD and CVD law regimes
can be made through an understanding of the basic elements of
liberal trade theory. In the realm of contract law generally, eco-
nomic theory favors private ordering and freedom of contract be-
tween informed parties to a bilaterally voluntary transaction.
This preference is based on the belief that such transactions will
tend to be welfare enhancing.24 Liberal trade theory reasons
that restrictions on the free movement of goods across national
borders entails a reduction in social welfare.
Liberal trade theory can be traced back to 1776 and Adam
Smith, who, in The Wealth of Nations, launched a broad assault
on prevailing theories of mercantilism. 25 Smith argued that
specialization in the production of goods in which one has an
absolute advantage, and trade of these goods for those in which
one does not have an absolute advantage, will lead to mutual
gains.26 Smith extended this argument to the international
context:
What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be
folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with
a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of
them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a
way in which we have some advantage.
2 7
In domestic economic activities, most of us agree that it makes
no sense for individuals to produce all of the goods and services
they wish to consume. For example, few of us find it rational to
grow all our own food, produce all our own clothes, build our own
23. See Michael J. Trebilcock, Throwing Deep: Trade Remedy Laws in a
First-Best World, in FAIR EXCHANGE: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS 235, 236
(Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert C. York eds., 1990).
24. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962).
25. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Modern Library ed. 1937).
26. Id. at vol. II, p. 23.
27. Id.
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shelter, do our own plumbing, perform our own medical services,
act as our own lawyers, or do our own dental work. In its ex-
treme form, this kind of autarky postulates an existence close to
that of the hermit or caveman. An individual is better off spe-
cializing in the production of some goods and services for con-
sumption and meeting remaining needs through the purchase of
goods and services produced by other individuals. On Smith's
theory, it follows that similar specialization is likely to generate
mutual gains in international exchanges.
The theory of absolute advantage failed, however, to answer
the question of whether trade would take place when a country
possesses no absolute advantages in relation to its trading part-
ners. In 1817, David Ricardo answered this question with the
theory of comparative advantage, which continues to form the
basis of conventional international trade theory today.28 Basi-
cally, this theory shows that trade flows are determined by the
relative costs of goods produced. 29 A country with no absolute
advantages will still benefit from specialization in goods for
which it is at a comparatively smaller cost disadvantage. Effi-
ciency considerations dictate production of goods in which one
has a relative cost advantage and trade for goods in which one
has a relative cost disadvantage.
Over time there have been many refinements to the theory
of comparative advantage.30 There remains the constant propo-
sition that liberal trade theory "rests ultimately upon the belief
that economic specialization produces gains in productive effi-
ciency and national income."31
Despite the compelling argument for allowing free trade
across national boundaries presented by liberal trade theory,
strains of mercantilism continue to exist today in the arguments
of economic nationalists. Those who espouse such views tend to
accept the competitive process in the domestic context, but not
at the international level. This differential approach, which dis-
criminates on the basis of where the parties to the transaction
are located, is indefensible on economic grounds. Free trade the-
ory encourages competition to extend across national bounda-
28. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXA-
TION (London, J. Murray 1817).
29. See id.
30. See Richard G. Harris, Trade, Industrial Policy and International Com-
petition, in 13 RESEARCH STUDIES OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC
UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR CANADA (1985).
31. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
172-73 (1987).
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ries, resulting in efficient allocation of global resources and
reduced global prices.32
In the absence of trade liberalization, gains from protection-
ism for domestic producers would equal the losses suffered by
domestic consumers forced to pay higher prices. When consum-
ers are denied lower priced foreign goods, higher domestic prices
force additional consumers out of the market altogether. As a
result, there is a net welfare loss in the domestic economy. In
contrast, an environment of internationally unimpeded trade re-
sults in consumer gains, including those consumers who would
otherwise have been priced out of the market. These gains will
exceed any losses suffered by domestic producers who are denied
opportunities which would have accrued to them in the absence
of trade liberalization. Trade remedy laws do not heed this logic.
In the course of providing protection to domestic producers,
trade remedy laws restrict the available contract opportunity set
for domestic consumers, both of inputs and final products.33
B. THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN LIBERAL TRADE THEORY AND
TRADE REMEDY LAws
ADD and CVD laws focus on the causes of an increase in
competing imports, such as cross-border pricing practices and
government subsidization. The typical argument in favor of
trade remedy protection posits that such protection reduces the
volume of imports which leads to an increase in domestic output
and profits. The domestic industry, therefore, is able to modern-
ize its capital equipment and become more competitive. 34
However, ADD and CVD laws generally fail to provide any
permanent relief from trade impacts. The grant of relief from
foreign competition may send the wrong signals to both employ-
ees and investors, resulting in new competitive disadvantages in
addition to those which already exist.35 Protection may lead to
increased wage demands by employees who anticipate greater
firm profitability. Protection may also encourage investment by
32. John J. Barcel6 III, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade: The
United States and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
491, 500 (1972).
33. Michael J. Trebilcock & John Quinn, The Canadian Antidumping Act:
A Reaction to Professor Slayton, 2 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 101, 113 (1979).
34. But see Robert E. Baldwin, Ineffectiveness of Protection in Promoting
Social Goals, 8 WORLD ECON. 109 (1985) (outlining and rejecting this argument
in favor of trade remedy protection).
35. See Marc Levinson, Asking For Protection is Asking for Trouble,
HARVARD Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1987, at 42.
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new industry entrants. Both of these developments can increase
the vulnerability of protected firms to import competition. The
international competitiveness of other domestic firms who use
these inputs may be impaired where trade remedy laws raise
the cost of imported inputs such as steel and textiles.
In the majority of cases, firms successfully securing protec-
tion will continue to be inefficient, and will not become interna-
tionally competitive again.36 The evidence indicates that
"companies emerge from the protected environment only to stag-
ger under the weight of competition .... The idea that [protec-
tion gives] a battered company temporary shelter without
sapping its vitality is a pipe dream."37
The extent to which so-called "unfairly" traded imports in-
jure domestic firms also appears to be widely exaggerated. A
recent U.S. study analyzed the effect of dumped and/or subsi-
dized imports on competing domestic industries between 1980
and 1988.38 The economic methodology employed estimated
what the performance of domestic industries competing with
dumped or subsidized imports would have been if such imports
had not been "unfairly" traded.39 By comparing this estimated
performance with the actual performance of these industries,
the effect of "unfairly" traded imports upon domestic industry is
calculated. Of the 179 cases analyzed, only fifty-three suffered a
loss greater than five percent in domestic industry revenue as a
result of unfairly traded imports.40 Only twenty-one cases in-
volved a loss greater than ten percent in revenue as a result of
"unfairly" traded imports.41 Because of the methodology em-
ployed and the data relied upon, the study found it likely that an
even smaller amount of domestic industries have suffered reve-
nue losses this large because of "unfairly" traded imports.
36. A study of 16 major industries receiving some form of trade protection
since 1950, such as ADDs or CVDs, concluded that after the protection was
removed, only one industry expanded while 15 continued to decline. Robert Z.
Lawrence & Robert E. Litan, Why Protectionism Doesn't Pay, HARVARD Bus.
REV., May-June 1987, at 60, 63. Another study showed that only when the pro-
tection provided by trade remedy laws extends indefinitely, and is constantly
increased, will the protected industry's output and employment levels be main-
tained. See Harry Flam et al., Optimal Subsidies to Declining Industries: Effi-
ciency and Equity Considerations, 22 J. PUB. ECON. 327 (1983).
37. Levinson, supra note 35, at 47.
38. MORRIS E. MorinRe & KENNETH H. KELLY, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, U.S.
FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTS OF UNFAIR IMPORTS ON DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES:
U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES, 1980 To 1988 ix (1994).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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In determining whether any policy response to increased
imports, whatever the cause, is appropriate, the impact on do-
mestic constituents must be examined. In liberal trade theory,
there is a net gain in domestic and global social welfare from
more liberal trade. However, this gain is often realized at the
expense of domestic producer interests. Therefore, a possible
policy response could evolve through a consideration of the ad-
verse trade impacts which accrue to certain domestic constitu-
ents. These adverse impacts result from increasing
international trade, irrespective of the causes of increased im-
ports. To put the matter succinctly:
The central policy issue that confronts governments, specifically in
mixed market economies and liberal democracies such as Canada's, is
the appropriate extent of collective responsibility for the consequences
of destructive features of the process of change, however much these
may be outweighed in the aggregate and in the longer term by their
creative potential.
42
There are two main groups within adversely affected firms
who may seek relief or compensation: the owners or sharehold-
ers, and the workers. Shareholders must provide strong
grounds to justify a redistribution because any relief or compen-
sation received comes at the expense of consumers or taxpay-
ers.43 Such grounds for shareholder claims do not exist, given
the mobility of capital and the ability to diversify risk through
portfolio investment.
Workers in domestic firms have a stronger claim to relief or
compensation. The economic assumption of perfect mobility in
factor markets is less valid in the context of labor than it is in
the context of capital. The transaction costs which accompany
the flow of capital from one use to another tend to be small when
contrasted with the financial and psychic costs borne by individ-
uals forced to retrain or relocate in order to obtain alternate em-
ployment. In addition to the imperfect mobility of labor, a claim
to compensation can be based on the inability to diversify invest-
ments in human capital. Particularly in cases of highly special-
ized human capital investments, the worker assumes a high
degree of undiversified risk.
42. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., TRADE AND TRANSITIONS: A COMPARA-
TIVE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 6 (1990) [hereinafter TRADE AND
TRANSITIONS].
43. Alan 0. Sykes, GATT Safeguards Reform: The Injury Test, in FAIR Ex-
CHANGE: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAws 203, 220 (Michael J. Trebilcock &
Robert C. York eds., 1990).
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Both Canada and the United States, however, have a social
safety net in place to protect displaced workers from extreme
hardship. In the case of a domestic firm failing as a result of the
inability to compete with other domestic firms, the displaced em-
ployees are only compensated or protected to the extent provided
by this social safety net. The relevant question is whether em-
ployees displaced by international competition should be treated
in the same manner, or whether they merit additional
assistance.
It is difficult to make a principled argument for treating the
worker facing unemployment as a result of increased imports in
a more favorable manner than the worker facing unemployment
as a result of domestic competition, technological change, or
shifts in demand. The impacts which accrue to the worker in
terms of adjustment costs are the same regardless of the cause
of the unemployment. Even if some form of assistance beyond
that which is provided by the social safety net is justified in the
case of trade-related job displacement, perhaps because of the
scale of the impacts in some cases, trade restrictions deal less
effectively with distributional issues than domestic adjustment
assistance programs. 44 To the greatest extent possible, the is-
sue of adjustment costs should be kept separate and distinct
from trade policy issues. The trade policy response offered by
ADD and CVD laws is inconsistent with liberal trade theory in
that it focuses on the causes of trade increases, rather than the
nature of trade impacts. To elaborate on this premise, both
ADD and CVD laws are discussed in more detail.
C. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ANTIDUMPING LAw
The practice of dumping is simply defined as international
price discrimination. 45 The relevant question is whether there
are any economic objections to international price discrimina-
tion from the perspective of the country receiving the lower
priced goods.
Price discrimination involves dividing the total market into
two or more consumer groups and charging each group a differ-
ent price. This practice is only possible in a market where im-
perfect competition negates the possibility of successful
44. See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INST., SAVING
FREE TRADE 12-14 (1986); JAGDISH BHAGWATI & T.N. SRINrvASAN, LECTURES ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1983).
45. For one of the first works to define dumping as international price dis-
crimination, see JACOB VINER, DUMPING (1923).
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arbitrage. Where price discrimination occurs within a single
economy, the objection is that the seller engaging in market seg-
mentation is "gouging" the group of consumers characterized by
relatively inelastic demand. In the international context where
dumping occurs, however, the consumers in the importing coun-
try belong to the group in whose favor the seller engaging in
market segmentation discriminates. As a whole, consumers in
the importing country benefit unambiguously from dumping,
through access to imported goods at a lower price. 46 It seems
counter-intuitive that consumers who purchase imported goods
should wish to be "gouged" by being required to pay the same
high price the exporter charges in its home market. This may be
the result of the fact that it has a protected position at home and
hence some degree of market power that it lacks in the export
market. Thus, economic analysis rejects the validity of ADD law
in the case of simple international price discrimination.
Predatory pricing has also been advanced as a justification
for the imposition of ADDs.4 7 Predation is the practice of sys-
tematically pricing below cost in the short run in an attempt to
eliminate rivals. Once rivals are eliminated, the predator's ulti-
mate objective is to obtain market power and subsequently raise
prices to supra-competitive levels. 48
Domestically, both Canada and the United States prohibit
predatory pricing through antitrust legislation. The economic
rationale is that a successful predation strategy, while lowering
prices in the short run, may reduce consumer welfare in the long
run, when higher monopoly prices result in some consumers be-
ing priced out of the market. This means that net losses to con-
sumers exceed the gains to the predator, creating an
economically inefficient result (a reduction in consumer welfare).
Internationally, the same economic rationale applies and
thereby justifies the prohibition of international predatory pric-
ing practices. The successful international predator causes the
46. Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Anti-dumping Law, in AN-
TIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 27 (John H. Jackson &
E.A. Vermulst eds., 1989). Several authors have advanced this argument. See
Barcel6, supra note 32, at 513; Trebilcock & Quinn, supra note 33, at 104; Hut-
ton & Trebilcock, supra note 11, at 125.
47. See VINER, supra note 45 (arguing that international price discrimina-
tion is basically harmless, with the exceptions of predation and short-run
dumping which destabilizes the domestic market).
48. See BRUCE DUNLOP ET AL., CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 208 (1987); see also Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willing, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation,
91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981).
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same long run reduction in consumer welfare as does the suc-
cessful domestic predator. There is a serious question, however,
as to whether predatory pricing in international markets war-
rants any special policy response, let alone justifies the specific
policy response provided by ADD law.
There are strong theoretical reasons and empirical evidence
suggesting that predatory pricing, and in particular, interna-
tional predation, will be a very improbable occurrence. In any
market and particularly international markets, sustainable
market power is extremely difficult to achieve through predatory
pricing.49 A corollary of setting prices below cost in the short
run is the occurrence of short-term losses for the predator. The
profit maximizing producer would only incur such losses if there
is a reasonable probability that such losses can be eventually
recouped through supra-competitive prices.
The international predator faces the formidable task of
eliminating not only domestic competition in the target market,
but worldwide competition as well.50 Even if the strategy of pre-
dation eliminates producers in the domestic market, an attempt
to raise prices to supra-competitive levels will attract both do-
mestic and foreign entrants. In fact, it is possible that when do-
mestic competitors are eliminated, their assets may be sold to
other competitors at prices well below their pre-existing value,
creating a situation in which the predator faces a new round of
competition from producers with reduced costs of production. 51
Thus, in the absence of significant barriers to entry for new com-
petitors, the cost of predation in terms of current revenue sacri-
ficed is unlikely to be offset by the benefit of future monopoly
rents.52 A recent study found that of the thirty Canadian ADD
cases resulting in positive final determinations between October
30, 1984, and February 3, 1989, none involved predatory pricing
on the part of the exporter.53
49. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1,
26 (1984); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-
strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); B.S. Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting:
Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON. 129 (1972).
50. See Barcel6, supra note 32, at 502.
51. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Avarelle Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing
and the Ninth Circuit, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 443, 460; see also John S. McGee,
Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980).
52. See Trebilcock & Quinn, supra note 33, at 105.
53. See Hutton & Trebilcock, supra note 11, at 123. In 26 of the 30 cases
studied, the number of actual or potential competitors from other countries was
sufficiently large to render futile any predation strategy. In two cases, the for-
eign competitor controlled an extremely small share of a Canadian market dom-
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Another justification for ADD laws is the prevention of mar-
ket destabilization caused by transitory or intermittent dump-
ing. The usual objection to this form of dumping is that when
carried out over a period of several months or years, it causes
exit and re-entry costs for domestic firms, leading to inefficient
resource allocation. 54
Intermittent dumping may occur when foreign exporters are
unable to successfully compete in the domestic market under
normal conditions. The foreign exporters sell in the domestic
market at low prices in order to maintain capacity utilization
and a high home market price during a period of low demand in
the home market.55 By doing so, the exporters may successfully
avoid the costs of temporary adjustment in plant utilization and
maintain current employment levels.5 6 Alternatively, intermit-
tent dumping may result from the need to clear the market in a
situation where there is an oversupply of perishable goods.
The capacity utilization argument will rarely describe the
actual motivation behind intermittent dumping. Of the thirty
Canadian ADD cases resulting in positive final determinations
between October 30, 1984, and February 3, 1989, only four cases
provided any indication that the exporter could possibly have
been involved in intermittent dumping. 57 Furthermore, none of
these cases involved firms seeking to maintain capacity utiliza-
tion or employment rates. All four cases involved perishable ag-
ricultural products and attempts by U.S. producers to clear a
inated by oligopolistic firms, making the acquisition of market power and the
elimination of the powerful Canadian producers unlikely. In the last two cases,
the availability of a close substitute made demand for the product in question
very price elastic, precluding the possibility of a successful predation strategy.
The evidence also indicated that rather than preventing foreign firms from
acquiring Canadian market power, ADDs may have enhanced the domestic
market power of Canadian firms. In several cases, the Canadian industry was
oligopolistic. Canadian firms seeking protection already had a degree of market
power and were invoking the protection of ADDs to prevent market erosion by
foreign imports. In other cases there was evidence that the injury was caused
by the inefficiency of the domestic firm seeking protection. These two types of
cases comprise 20 of the 30 cases reviewed, supporting the conclusion that
ADDs promote domestic inefficiency and indeed protect from competition Cana-
dian firms with market power who may be reaping supra-competitive profits at
the expense of domestic consumers. Id.
54. See VrNER, supra note 45; James A. Kohn, The Antidumping Act: Its
Administration and Place in American Trade Policy, 60 MICH. L. REV. 407, 410
(1962).
55. See Trebilcock & Quinn, supra note 33, at 110.
56. See WILLIAM A. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COM-
MERICAL POLICY 82 (1977).
57. See Hutton & Trebilcock, supra note 11, at 130.
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market characterized by conditions of oversupply. It should be
noted, however, that such agricultural products tend to have
fluctuating production cycles. Even in the absence of imports,
Canadian producers would have faced depressed prices. The im-
position of an ADD simply raises future domestic prices, thereby
making inefficient production economically viable.58 The eco-
nomic costs generated by industry instability are not addressed
by a trade remedy which focuses on the source of increased sup-
ply rather than the nature of the subsequent competitive
impacts.
In summary, there are no economic justifications for ADD
law. In reality, what is called dumping in the international con-
text is usually just healthy competition, generally welcomed in
the domestic context. Foreign firms with legitimate comparative
advantages are branded unfair traders for performing in a man-
ner which would be commendable had they been domestic
producers. 59
The only practice which ADD law purports to address,
which is unambiguously worthy of some policy response, is pred-
atory pricing. ADD law, however, is an inappropriate response,
as it provides a means for domestic producers to impede the en-
try of competitively priced goods into the domestic market,
thereby allowing oligopolistic or inefficient domestic firms to
charge excessive prices. Antitrust legislation presents a more
direct policy response to the problem of predation. The applica-
tion of antitrust legislation to international predation is dis-
cussed in our reform proposals.
D. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAw
The purpose of CVD law is to offset competitive advantages
which accrue to foreign exporters as a result of government sub-
sidies. From a strictly national point of view, economic analysis
attempts to determine whether the imposition of a CVD by the
importing country would lead to an increase or a decrease in the
overall welfare of that country. In a recent article, Alan Sykes
convincingly demonstrated that if "social welfare" is defined as
the maximization of producer, consumer, and government sur-
58. Id. at 131.
59. See J. Michael Finger et al., The Political Economy of Administered
Protection, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 452 (1982); see generally ANTmUMPING: How rr
WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT chs. 1-4 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993).
1995]
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
plus, in almost every conceivable set of circumstances CVDs re-
duce domestic social welfare in the importing country. 60
The imposition of a CVD on foreign producers increases the
price at which their goods are sold in the domestic market. This
reduces the price competition faced by domestic producers, who
are able to increase their own prices accordingly. However, the
gains to domestic producers are offset by losses to domestic con-
sumers forced to pay the higher price. There is a further loss to
consumers in that some who would have purchased the product
in question are priced out of the market and suffer a welfare
loss. Even after accounting for the increase in government sur-
plus in terms of revenue from duties, consumer welfare loss ex-
ceeds producer and government surplus.
The above analysis is often confronted by a "fairness" argu-
ment in the United States. According to this argument, the
United States should play a unilateral role in ensuring the max-
imization of economic efficiency both globally and regionally,
through the exertion of pressure for the elimination of distortive
subsidies. This argument has been subject to much criticism.6 1
First, it assumes that unilateral action will be effective in forc-
ing foreign governments to cease their subsidization practices.
In reality, unilateral action may have the opposite effect. One
nation's action may lead to another country's retaliatory poli-
cies, creating a scenario in which protectionist interests in both
countries thrive. 62 Second, seeking to achieve fairness through
such mechanisms opens the door for the capture of the process
by concentrated and organized producer interests at the expense
of diffuse consumer interests. The fairness argument is often
simply a rhetorical convention attempting to provide some legit-
imacy to the imposition of CVDs. This process takes place
through the application of technical and arcane rules which pro-
tect domestic industries and have little or no basis in any coher-
ent conception of fairness.6 3
60. See Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 210 (1989).
61. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Fair Trade, Reciprocity and Harmonization:
The New Challenge to the Theory and Policy of Free Trade, in ANALYTICAL AND
NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 547 (Alan V. Deardorff &
Robert M. Stern eds., 1994); Robert E. Hudec, "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall": The
Concept of Fairness in United States Trade Policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1990
CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 88 (1990).
62. See Bhagwati, supra note 61.
63. See Hudec, supra note 61.
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The attempted justification of CVD law as a means through
which major users such as the United States can act unilaterally
as a global or regional policeman, attempting to deter govern-
ments which engage in trade distorting subsidization practices,
faces another intractable problem. Administrators of domestic
CVD regimes face the daunting task of evaluating which foreign
subsidies contribute to, or derogate from, efficient resource allo-
cation. Warren Schwartz and Eugene Harper convincingly show
this task to be highly indeterminate. 64 Their analysis addresses
the pervasiveness of externalities which subsidies may help to
internalize.65 They also recognize the existence of preferences
which may not be adequately captured in private market trans-
actions, such as promotion of regional development or preserva-
tion of the family farm or rural lifestyles.66 They also note the
possibility that positive governmental benefits conferred upon a
firm may be designed to offset some other governmental burden,
such as high minimum wage laws or demanding environmental
regulations. 67 Thus, it is not surprising that domestic CVD law
regimes do not provide a means for distinguishing cases of ineffi-
cient subsidization from cases where no inefficiency is
involved.68
The rejection of a policy of unilateral invocations of CVD
law to combat subsidization practices of foreign governments
should not be taken as an endorsement of extensive subsidiza-
tion as a tool of industrial policy. Admittedly, in some cases, the
use of government subsidies can correct market failures and
thereby enhance the economic welfare of the subsidizing coun-
try. However, they also often lead to distortions in resource allo-
cation and a decrease in domestic welfare. 69 Where there are
export spillovers, there will also be distortions in foreign
markets.
Where subsidization clearly creates market distortions, the
reduction of such distortions will lead to an increase in economic
efficiency within the international or regional market. However,
CVD law is not the appropriate policy instrument for achieving
64. See Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, The Regulation of Subsi-
dies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1972).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See John J. Barcel6 III, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties: Analysis
and a Proposal, 9 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779 (1977).
69. Sykes, supra note 60, at 214.
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this result. An alternative approach is set out in our reform
proposals.
E. SAFEGUARDS AND ADJUSTMENT COSTS
An alternative means of securing protection from foreign
competition is through the invocation of safeguard measures.
The use of safeguard measures is governed at the multilateral
level by Article XIX of the GATT. 70 This provision permits a
party to withdraw or modify previous trade concessions where
these concessions have resulted in a surge of imports that cause
or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers of like
or directly competitive products. 71 Safeguard action may be
taken for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy
such injury. 72 The Uruguay Round Safeguards Agreement sub-
stantially constrains the safeguard regime through time limits
and prohibitions on renewal.7 3 In the regional context, such
"emergency relief" is provided for in Chapter 11 of the FTA74
and Chapter 8 of NAFTA, 75 subject to a three-year time
limitation.76
Economic arguments in support of safeguard measures are
not especially convincing. The most common justification cited
is that safeguard actions can provide an ailing firm or industry
with "breathing space" from foreign competition. Safeguard ac-
tion leads to the generation of profits which can be invested in
new plant and equipment, thereby allowing the firm or industry
to compete successfully against foreign exporters in the future.77
Three difficulties arise with this argument. First, it as-
sumes that governments intend and are able to select those in-
dustries likely to become competitive again, when in fact they
may simply be responding to well organized lobbying efforts by
firms and industries more interested in securing protection than
in becoming internationally competitive. Second, it ignores the
70. See GATT, supra note 2.
71. Id. art. XIX:1.
72. Id.
73. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods; Agreement on Safeguards, art. 7, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, at 276 [hereinafter Final Act].
74. See FTA, supra note 5.
75. See NAFTA, supra note 6.
76. FTA, supra note 5, art. 1101(2)(b); NAFTA, supra note 6, art.
801(2)(c)(i).
77. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 150 (1989).
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fact that direct assistance to individuals facing adjustment costs
as a result of increased trade liberalization is likely to be a less
socially burdensome and more economically defensible ap-
proach. Third, it dismisses the fact that government interven-
tion for restoring competitiveness is unnecessary in countries
with well-developed capital markets. In these situations private
lenders can finance the efforts of ailing firms to become interna-
tionally competitive in cases where the expected return from do-
ing so justifies the costs incurred. 78
Safeguard actions, like ADD and CVD laws, are often sim-
ply another means of imposing trade restrictions in the interests
of protecting domestic constituents. From an economic perspec-
tive, safeguard actions are no more defensible than ADD or CVD
laws, in that their effect is the protection of a domestic industry
at the expense of a reduction in net domestic and global social
welfare.
F. NON-ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR TRADE REMEDY LAWS
While there are few economic reasons for trade remedy
laws, economic efficiency is not the only normative criterion
which can or should drive the policymaking process. Non-eco-
nomic criteria are often advanced in defense of particular policy
responses to domestic problems, including problems related to
international trade. Two non-economic criteria which poten-
tially justify the existence of ADD law, CVD law, or safeguards
are distributive justice and communitarianism.79 Even if these
justify some policy response, however, neither theory can justify
the retention of ADD law, CVD law, or safeguards.
A social contractarian ethical perspective, grounded in pin-
ciples of distributive justice, posits that society has a moral obli-
gation not to pursue collective policies which prejudice its least-
advantaged members.8 0 This theory has been advanced as a
justification for ADD law, CVD law, and safeguards as a means
by which low-skill, low-wage workers can avoid dislocation costs.
This theory argues that where distributive justice values are vi-
olated as a result of international trade the protection of these
values should take priority over concerns for economic efficiency.
78. Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a 'Safeguard. A Positive Analysis of the
GATT 'Escape Clause' With Normative Speculations, 58 U. CH. L. REV. 255, 264
(1991).
79. For a more detailed discussion of these theories, see TRADE AND TRANSI-
TIONS, supra note 42.
80. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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Even if this theory is accepted, a Canadian study found that
distributive justice concerns possibly justified a policy response
in only six of thirty Canadian cases in which ADDs were im-
posed. 81 In the remaining twenty-four cases, the wages paid to
workers in the industry receiving the protection of ADDs were
found to be well above the average national industrial wage.8 2
Where the workers protected are not within the group of least-
advantaged persons which the distributive justice perspective
seeks to protect, there can be no justification for providing them
with special compensation at the expense of consumers, many of
whom may themselves fall within this group of least-advantaged
persons.
Even in the six cases where the workers could be considered
among the least-advantaged members of society, trade remedy
law responses were inappropriate. No principled reason exists
for providing special treatment to the least-advantaged mem-
bers of society harmed by foreign competition without extending
the same treatment to the least-advantaged members of society
harmed by domestic competition. Thus, the distributive justice
ethical perspective cannot be used as a normative justification
for the retention of ADD law, CVD law, or safeguards.
Communitarian theory posits that, to a significant extent,
individuals derive their identities from their roles and relation-
ships within the community. 3 As with distributive justice, pro-
ponents of this view argue that communitarian values should
take priority over concerns for economic efficiency. In the con-
text of trade impacts from international competition, the com-
munitarian view would seek to protect workers and others from
disruption of long-standing community ties and social networks.
Allowing firms to fail and compensating the employees for the
loss of their jobs or otherwise providing adjustment assistance
may not be an acceptable alternative for the communitarian, as
this may involve the severance of community bonds. At the
least, ties to workplace colleagues would be severed. In some
cases, relocation may be required, which would lead to the sever-
ance of extended family and neighborhood ties. In short, the
communitarian would consider a severe disturbance of these
community attachments to involve the loss of a significant part
81. Hutton & Trebilcock, supra note 11, at 133.
82. Id. at 132.
83. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
[Vol. 4:1
LiBERALIZING TRADE REMEDY LA WS
of one's human identity, which may not be -fully compensable
with money.8 4
Even if the communitarian theory is accepted, the Canadian
study found that communitarian concerns could potentially jus-
tify some form of policy response in at most nine of the thirty
Canadian cases because the domestic firms involved were major
employers in small communities.8 5 In the remaining twenty-one
cases, any potential dislocation of labor as a result of low-priced
imports would have occurred in major industrial centers able to
absorb into similar or alternate employment the typically small
number of workers at risk.86
Even in those cases where communitarian concerns may
call for a policy response, ADD law is still inappropriate. There
is no principled reason for providing special protection of the
community attachments of workers facing displacement as a re-
sult of trade impacts caused by foreign competitors, when there
is no similar protection of the community attachments of work-
ers facing displacement as a result of trade impacts caused by
domestic competition. Thus, while communitarian values may
justify some form of assistance to displaced workers, it cannot
justify the retention of ADD law, CVD law, or safeguards.
G. THE POLITICS OF PROTECTIONISM
In developing a regime to replace the current system of
trade remedy laws, it would be futile to simply assume a one-
dimensional world in which the dictates of economic efficiency
reign supreme. As has been shown, if economic theory were de-
terminative, current trade remedy laws would be abandoned.
Nor is it sufficient to supplement an economic analysis of trade
remedy laws with other normative theories, such as distributive
justice and communitarianism. The consideration of these theo-
ries is equally unconvincing in terms of providing a normative
justification for the existence of trade remedy laws. Reform pro-
posals must recognize the policymaking processes that have cre-
ated the current trade remedy law regime. In reality: "While
economic theory can be useful in analyzing the consequences of
protection, explanations of why protection comes about, why it
84. TRADE AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 42, at 12.
85. Hutton & Trebilcock, supra note 11, at 137. Four of the nine cases may
also have engaged distributive justice concerns. Id.
86. Id.
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takes particular forms, and why it continues, would often appear
to be more in the realm of political economy."8 7
The best explanation for why troubled industries success-
fully convince governments of their entitlement to protection
through the application of trade remedy laws is provided by pub-
lic choice theory. This theory is an economic model of politics
which holds that the supply of public policies will be such as to
maximize political parties' or representatives' prospects for elec-
tion or re-election. 88
In the trade policy context, domestic producers facing im-
port competition are the interest group with the greatest influ-
ence. This group typically has a greater incentive to organize,
lower mobilization and lobbying costs, and a greater ability to
avoid free riders than the more widely dispersed consumers and
other bearers of the costs of trade protection. Thus, under public
choice theory, "economically irrational policy choices are explica-
ble as inevitable responses to rent-seeking behavior by concen-
trated interests." 9 Such rent-seeking behavior results in
substantial costs being borne by the society as a whole, in terms
of reduced economic efficiency. 90
In theory, the imposition of such costs on society should face
serious opposition from consumer interests, as is made clear by
a substantial body of empirical evidence on the relative costs
and benefits of trade protection. For example, in 1984, protec-
tion of the U.S. specialty steel industry through voluntary re-
straint agreements cost U.S. consumers $1 million per job saved,
at a time when the average annual salary for specialty steel
workers averaged less than $60,000.91 In 1980, footwear quotas
and tariffs cost U.S. consumers $77,714 per job saved, at a time
when the annual wage averaged only $8340.92 In 1983, protec-
87. W. MAX CORDEN, PROTECTION AND LIBERALIZATION: A REVIEW OF ANA-
LYTICAL IssuEs 12 (International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 54,
1987).
88. See ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
89. TRADE AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 42, at 171.
90. For a more detailed discussion, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Directly Unpro-
ductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, 90 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1982); Anne 0.
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am. ECON. REV.
291 (1974); G. Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224 (1967).
91. See GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., INST. FOR INT'L ECON., TRADE PROTEC-
TIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE STUDIES 154 (1986).
92. Murray L. Weidenbaum & Michael C. Munger, Protection at Any
Price?, 7 REG. 14, 17 (1983).
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tion of the U.S. automobile industry through the imposition of
import restrictions cost U.S. consumers $160,000 per job saved,
while the annual compensation of U.S. auto workers averaged
less than $40,000. 9 3 In Canada, trade restrictions in the foot-
wear industry annually cost consumers between $53,668 and
$69,460 per job saved, where average annual earnings were
$7145; trade restrictions in the textile and clothing industry an-
nually cost between $40,600 and $50,942 per job saved, where
annual earnings averaged $10,000; trade restrictions in the au-
tomobile industry annually cost consumers between $179,000
and $226,394 per job saved, where earnings averaged between
$29,000 and $35,000. 94
The absence in practice of intense consumer opposition to
trade protection is largely explained by the higher mobilization
and lobbying costs faced by consumers. Each consumer will typ-
ically have a small stake in any given trade dispute. Consumers
have a reduced incentive to overcome information and transac-
tion costs in organizing for political action, as well as the free
rider problem which adversely affects the organizational efforts
of such a large and widely dispersed interest group.95
Another convincing explanation for the frequent success of
protectionist over anti-protectionist interests is the traditional
conceptualization of trade issues. For example, those bearing
the costs of protection often mistakenly believe that it results in
a redistribution from foreign to domestic producers. In reality,
there is a loss in both consumer and net societal welfare, and
any redistribution taking place is from domestic consumers to
93. Robert W. Crandall, Import Quotas and the Automobile Industry: The
Costs of Protectionism, 2 BROOKINGS REV. 4, 8 (1984).
94. See TRADE AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 42, at 76.
95. Id. at 173; Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking and
Trade Protection, Aussenwirtschaft 303 (1986); see also MICHAEL J. TREBIL-
COCK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: THE CASE OF DE-
CLINING SECTORS (1986). Some constraints on the ability of industries to obtain
protection from import competition are provided by the presence of domestic
interests opposing such protection. For example, large importers of intermedi-
ate inputs can be expected to oppose protection of higher cost domestic produ-
cers of such inputs. Export oriented domestic industries, concerned over the
potential for retaliation against their exports, can also be expected to oppose the
imposition of trade barriers against foreign trading partners. Finally, domestic
distributors and large retail chains who often rely extensively on the availabil-
ity of low-priced imports, provide further opposition to protectionist domestic
policies. The combined political influence of the above interests provides some
important checks on the rent-seeking ability of domestic producers. See I.M.
DESTLER & JOHN ODELL, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING
FORCES IN UNITED STATES TRADE POLITICS (1987).
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domestic producers. 96 In effect, consumers are the victims of an
enduring mercantilist myth, a myth which is deliberately nur-
tured by its beneficiaries.
This suggests that the economic costs of protection are
largely unknown to those who bear them. More political ground
can be gained by imposing ADDs or CVDs, with their "hidden"
costs to domestic consumers, than by embracing some other pol-
icy response which may increase net social welfare but entail
more concentrated costs for domestic producers, and transpar-
ent costs for voters.
H. CONCLUSION
This section demonstrates that there is no normative ra-
tionale for the retention of ADD law, CVD law, or safeguards.
An economic analysis shows that the imposition of these trade
remedies results in a reduction in net social welfare. Non-eco-
nomic theories, such as distributive justice and communitarian-
ism, are equally incapable of providing a normative rationale for
trade remedy laws. The primary explanation for the use of trade
remedy laws is provided by theories of political economy. This
analysis sets the stage for the reform proposals presented in the
following section.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM OF
TRADE REMEDY LAW
The development of a politically attainable solution to the
problem of trade remedy laws which Canada and the United
States might be willing to adopt will be based on the following
premises. First, the underlying goal behind any reform must be
the achievement of a greater degree of economic integration,
which will increase net social welfare in each country and within
the free trade area as a whole. Second, the attainment of this
degree of economic integration must not require an unacceptable
loss of political sovereignty to either Canada or the United
States. While economic integration should be promoted, polit-
ical considerations constrain the degree of integration which is
achievable. Any solution which fails to recognize this constraint
is of little practical value. Third, any suggested solutions must
attempt to minimize perceptions of the need for drastic change.
The following recommendations will attempt to build upon fa-
miliar institutional structures in place under the FTA and
96. See Finger, supra note 59.
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NAFTA, as well as trade liberalizing policies which have been
implemented in other regions.
A. DUMPING AND THE USE OF DOMESTIC COMPETITION LAw
Our discussion of the economic rationales for ADD law led
to the conclusion that of the three perceived evils ADD law
sought to address, the only evil worthy of some form of policy
response on economic grounds was predatory pricing. ADD law,
however, was found to be an inappropriate response. To address
instances of international predation, we recommend an exten-
sion of predatory pricing provisions in domestic competition
statutes to predatory practices engaged in by foreign competi-
tors. A model for such reform is presented by Australia and
New Zealand, where there exists a trade relationship similar to
that of Canada and the United States.9 7 As barriers to the free
flow of goods between these two countries were progressively re-
duced, the relevance of ADD law decreased.
In 1988, a protocol to the Australia-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations Trade Agreement was executed, under
which both countries agreed to abolish ADDs with respect to
goods originating in the other country and to terminate existing
duties.98 The application of competition law to the problem of
predation was accomplished through an amendment to Section
46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974,9 9 and Section 36
of the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986.100 These provisions
define "market" in relation to the offense of abuse of market
dominance. Both definitions of "market" were amended to in-
clude the "trans-Tasman market," which in turn is defined as
including any market in Australia or New Zealand. Both coun-
tries amended their "abuse or misuse of dominant position" pro-
visions to permit complainants in one country to initiate
complaints about the conduct of producers in the other country.
97. See Geoffrey Palmer, International Trade Blocs-New Zealand and
Australia: Beyond CER, 1 PUB. L. REV. 223 (1990) (discussing the trade rela-
tionship between Australia and New Zealand). In 1966, New Zealand and Aus-
tralia executed a bilateral Free Trade Agreement. New Zealand-Australia Free
Trade Agreement, Aug. 31, 1965, 554 U.N.T.S. 169. In 1983, these two coun-
tries executed the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement. Australia-New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1983, 1983
Austl. T.S. No. 2, 1983 N.Z.T.S. No. 1.
98. Protocol to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations
Trade Agreement on Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods, Aug. 18, 1988, art. 4,
1988 Austl. T.S. No. 18.
99. AusTL. C. AcTs No. 51, art. 46 (1974).
100. N.Z. Stat. No. 5, art. 36 (1986).
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At the same time, a series of procedural innovations were
adopted, authorizing a court sitting in one country to hear a
complaint by domestic producer interests in that country
against producers in the other country. These changes permit a
court in the first country to hold hearings, take evidence in the
other country, and to have subpoenas and other orders enforced
in that country. The relevant substantive amendments to the
competition legislation in both countries clearly focus on preda-
tory behavior by firms based in one country exporting to the
other country's markets, and not on price discrimination.
Such a solution is readily transferable to Canada and the
United States. 10 1 The substantive trade law and competition
law provisions in the two countries would require only minor ad-
justment. Canada would need to amend the Special Import
Measures Act 10 2 to prohibit ADD investigations and the imposi-
tion of ADDs with respect to goods originating in the United
States, and to provide for the revocation of all existing ADD
measures against U.S. products. In addition, Canada would
need to amend the Competition Act 10 3 to allow provisions deal-
ing with predatory pricing, primarily Section 50(1)(c), to be in-
voked against the producers of goods originating in the United
States. This would require re-defining the term "market" to in-
clude the United States, following the Australia-New Zealand
model.
The United States would need to amend the Tariff Act of
1930104 to prohibit ADD investigations and the imposition of
ADDs with respect to goods originating in Canada, and to pro-
vide for the revocation of all existing ADD measures against Ca-
nadian products. The Sherman Act'0 5 needs no amendment as
it already prohibits predatory pricing by foreign sellers through
the prohibition of attempted monopolization. The definition of
"attempted monopolization" includes attempts to control prices
or to destroy competition through predatory or anticompetitive
101. See Presley L. Warner, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment: The Case for Replacing Antidumping with Antitrust, 23 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 791 (1992) (advocating the replacement of antidumping law with
competition law for the purposes of predatory pricing); see also Report of the
Task Force of the Antitrust Section on the Competitive Dimension of NAFTA,
1994 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 252-55.
102. R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985) (Can.).
103. R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.).
104. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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conduct which has a dangerous probability of success. 10 6 The
substitution of predatory pricing complaints under the Sherman
Act for antidumping law, therefore, is not a novel idea.107
Some amendments would be required in terms of harmoniz-
ing the procedural and remedial aspects of each regime's re-
sponse to the problem of predatory pricing.' 08 A procedural
mechanism would need to be developed to allow for the enforce-
ment of the domestic regimes against foreigners. This could be
done by following the Australia-New Zealand model outlined
above, which allows, for example, an Australian court to sit in
New Zealand and enforce subpoenas, injunctions, and sanctions
in the foreign state.10 9 In terms of private remedies, there is a
key difference between Canada and the United States. The
Clayton Act provides for the award of treble damages," 0 while
the Competition Act only provides for the award of single dam-
ages."' One solution is an amendment to the Competition Act
providing for the award of treble damages against an American
firm whose activity within Canada is successfully challenged.
This may, however, violate the National Treatment principle
contained in Article III of the GATT 1 2 which has been incorpo-
rated in the FTA113 and NAFTA."1 4 If so, the converse reforms
to U.S. law would need to be considered, or alternatively, Cana-
dian firms would have to resign themselves to asymmetric
liability.
The competition law solution greatly reduces the degree of
protectionism in both countries. It narrows the scope of pricing
practices considered unfair to those which can truly have an ad-
verse effect on economic efficiency, such as the elimination of
competitors through predation. It also applies the same set of
rules to both domestic and foreign competitors. Objections to
the extra-territorial application of foreign competition laws to
domestic industries, however, are to be anticipated. Such objec-
tions are not valid for there is simply a substitution of one do-
106. See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Thurman In-
dustries v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, 875 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1989).
107. See, e.g., John J. Barcel6 III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It Or Re-
vise It, in ANTIDUMPING LAw: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION (John H. Jackson
ed., 1979).
108. See Warner, supra note 101.
109. Palmer, supra note 97, at 229-30.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
111. R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 36(1) (1985) (Can.).
112. GATT, supra note 2.
113. FTA, supra note 5, art. 501.
114. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 301.
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mestic regime for another, in this case, competition law for ADD
law. The concern with respect to extra-territoriality could be
further alleviated by providing a binational mechanism for the
review of domestic decisions made by antitrust authorities
which affect foreign interests. For example, the mandate of the
binational panels, established under Chapter 19 of the FTA115
and Chapter 19 of NAFTA, 1 6 could be extended to include the
review of decisions made by domestic authorities charged with
the implementation of competition law where these directly af-
fect foreign interests.
On a more basic level, it has been suggested that the United
States would not be willing to give Canada an exemption from
the application of ADD law, or that such an exemption would
come at an unacceptably high price in terms of reciprocal conces-
sions. 1 7 This argument is also unpersuasive. As noted earlier,
in sharp contrast to CVD law where the United States is clearly
the dominant user, there is much greater symmetry in Canadian
and U.S. utilization rates of ADD law."I8 This evidence makes it
clear that the United States, as well as Canada, would stand to
gain substantially from restraining the utilization of the ADD
regime. Further, the political feasibility of this proposal is bol-
stered by the fact that it draws upon the existing arrangement
in the Australia-New Zealand regional trading bloc. As well, it
should be noted that in the European Union, neither ADD nor
CVD actions can be brought between member states, and issues
of cross-border pricing and government subsidization are dealt
with as aspects of competition policy." 9
Perhaps the most important aspect of the competition law
proposal is shifting the focus from protection of domestic produ-
cers to protection of domestic consumers. Competition law, as
its name suggests, seeks to promote effective competition in the
domestic economy with the result tending to be enhanced eco-
nomic efficiency, and increased consumer welfare. In contrast,
ADD law protects domestic producers from foreign competition,
usually to the detriment of consumers and with a net reduction
in social welfare.
115. FTA, supra note 5, Annex 1901.2.
116. NAFTA, supra note 6, Annex 1901.2.
117. John A. Kazanjian, Competition Law and Trade Policy: Honk if You
Love Competition Policy, 14 CAN. COMPETITION POL'Y REC. 71, 74 (1993).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
119. Warner, supra note 101, at 855; TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 1, at
chs. II and VI.
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B. A NEW APPROACH TO COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND
SUBSIDIES
Our preferred approach accepts as a starting point the gen-
eral taxonomic approach embodied in the new Uruguay Round
Subsidies Agreement. 120 The Agreement classifies subsidies as
"prohibited,"121 "actionable"122 and "non-actionable."1 23 How-
ever, in our approach, the regime would consist primarily of
supra-national dispute resolution panels (Track II). Unilateral
application of countervailing duties (Track I) would be restricted
to a narrow class of prohibited export subsidies, perhaps defined
as subsidies where at least eighty percent of the output of subsi-
dized foreign firms is exported. Track II would be the exclusive
avenue of recourse for addressing actionable subsidies, consid-
ered countervailable as specific subsidies under the Agreement,
and no remedy of any kind would be available in the case of non-
actionable subsidies, which would largely reflect the Agree-
ment's definition as including non-specific subsidies and some
specific subsidies for research, environmental protection and al-
leviation of economically disadvantaged regions.
If a subsidy has some adverse trade effects but is also serv-
ing legitimate non-trade related domestic policy goals, remedial
action should only be taken following investigation by a supra-
national panel. The panel would determine whether the subsidy
is actionable and would mandate appropriate remedial or retali-
atory action. In formulating the standards to be applied by sub-
sidies panels, the experience of review panels established under
Chapter 18 of the FTA may be helpful. In recent cases involving
disagreements about the legitimacy of government policies influ-
encing trade, the panels have adopted a "least restrictive means"
test.
In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific
Coast Salmon and Herring124 is an example of the least restric-
tive means test. 25 Canada argued that the domestic landing
requirement was an essential component of resource conserva-
120. See Final Act, supra note 73, Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, at 229.
121. Id. art. 3, at 231.
122. Id. art. 5, at 233.
123. Id. art. 8, at 237.
124. Panel No. CDA-89-1807-01, Oct. 16, 1989, 1989 WL 250302, 1989
FTAPD LEXIS 6 [hereinafter Landing Requirement].
125. T.L. McDorman, Using the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade
Agreement: The West Coast Salmon and Herring Problem, 4 CAN.-U.S. Bus. L.
REV. 117, 179 (1991).
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tion and exempt under GATT Article XX(g) 12 6 from the prohibi-
tion on export restrictions under Article XI.127 Because the
objectives of the policy could have been achieved through land-
ing and other monitoring requirements less restrictive of trade,
however, the panel did not sustain the policy. 128
The paradigmatic formulation of the least restrictive means
test is found in the case law under Section 1 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.129 In order to sustain a limit
on a Charter right, the limit must have a valid objective. In ad-
dition, the means chosen to reach that objective must be ration-
ally connected to the objective and be the least restrictive
means, or the means that least impairs the right in question.
This approach should be adopted to deal with the indeterminate
class of reviewable or actionable subsidies. If a subsidy is ra-
tionally connected to a legitimate non-trade related policy objec-
tive, such as those previously set out in Article 11 of the Tokyo
Round Subsidies Code 130 or Article XX of the GATT, 131 and is
the least trade restrictive policy instrument available to achieve
that objective, it should be sustained, but not otherwise. This
test should encourage governments to seek out domestic policy
instruments with minimum trade distortions.
Thus, we envision that an international subsidies regime
could feasibly aspire to define a category of subsidies that are
immune from challenge either unilaterally or bilaterally, along
the lines of "non-actionable subsidies" in the Uruguay Round
Subsidies Agreement. 132 Another category of subsidies, princi-
pally subsidies that are de jure or de facto pure export subsidies,
would be per se objectionable both unilaterally and bilaterally.
For the wide array of intermediate subsidies that do not fall into
either of these two categories, we envision only a supra-national
dispute resolution route. This regime would entail panels apply-
ing a least restrictive means test, with an adverse panel deter-
mination required before retaliation could be undertaken.
Invocation of domestic countervailing duty regimes would not be
126. GATT, supra note 2.
127. Id. art. XI:1.
128. Landing Requirement, supra note 124.
129. See R. v. Oakes, 26 D.L.R. 4th, at 200 (S.C.C. 1986) (Can.).
130. GATT, Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII of the GATT, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, reprinted in 26th Supp.
BISD 56 (1980).
131. GATT, supra note 2.
132. See Final Act, supra note 73, Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, art. 8, at 237.
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possible unless and until such an adverse determination had
been made. Even here we would retain the Chapter 19 bina-
tional review mechanism under the FTA and NAFTA to monitor
domestic margin and injury determinations. 133 We believe that
this approach recognizes the complex welfare judgments en-
tailed in evaluating the economic effects of subsidies. Addition-
ally, this approach is respectful, within reasonable limits, of the
domestic sovereignty of member states to pursue a wide range of
non-trade related domestic policy objectives of their choosing
without risking unilateral punitive measures from other coun-
tries with divergent perspectives on the wisdom of those policies.
C. SAFEGUARDS AND THE ADJUSTMENT COST ISSUE
As is always the case where trade liberalization occurs,
there will be adjustment costs borne by certain sectors of society.
The most effective response is through the implementation of
worker adjustment assistance programs which are equally avail-
able to workers displaced as a result of international or domestic
competition. Such a solution, while compelling in a world where
the policymaking process is exclusively driven by economics, is
unlikely to prevail once political considerations are taken into
account. Absent countervailing pressures from the producers
whose product is to be restricted, which would exist in a purely
domestic context, pressure from domestic firms faced with losses
will in many cases make import restrictions politically expedi-
ent, despite their negative effect on net social welfare. We rec-
ommend that such import restrictions take the form of a well-
conceived safeguards regime that focuses on the nature of trade
impacts rather than the causes of trade increases.
As discussed above, the safeguard action which results in
the protection of a domestic industry at the expense of net social
welfare is no more defensible than ADD or CVD law from an
economic perspective.' 34 Economic efficiency would prescribe a
binding commitment to a policy of free trade without any corre-
sponding right to resort to safeguard relief. The retention of a
safeguards regime in this proposal, however, has as its basis the
need to accommodate political realities.
In approaching negotiations on trade liberalization, politi-
cians will tend to be concerned that trade concessions may have
future adverse political consequences. This concern can create
133. See FTA, supra note 5; NAFTA, supra note 6.
134. See supra part II.E.
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an unwillingness on the part of elected officials to embrace trade
liberalizing measures to the extent suggested by the dictates of
economic efficiency. The safeguard measure can play a key role
in alleviating such concerns. The measure's existence may en-
courage cautious countries to accept greater trade liberalizing
initiatives than would otherwise be the case. 135 This explana-
tion for the retention of safeguards was recently summarized by
Sykes:
[U]nanticipated changes in economic conditions may create circum-
stances in which the political rewards to an increase in protection (or
the political costs of an irrevocable commitment to reduce protection)
are great. Consequently, in the absence of an escape clause, trade
negotiators may decline to make certain reciprocal concessions for fear
of adverse political consequences in the future. But, with an escape
clause in place the negotiators will agree on a greater number of recip-
rocal concessions, knowing that those concessions can be avoided later
if political conditions so dictate. 1
36
Thus, the recognition of political realities makes the retention of
a safeguards regime an essential element for increased trade
liberalization.
Chapter 8 of NAFTA provides for a safeguards regime. 137 A
major concern is that the elimination of ADD law and the pro-
posed limitations on CVD law will lead to an increase in the use
of other trade restrictions such as safeguards. Chapter 8 of
NAFTA is more responsive to this concern than is Article XIX of
the GATT. 138 For example, safeguard relief, which is restricted
to tariffs, is only available in the bilateral or trilateral context
for three years on a non-renewable basis, although the new Uru-
guay Round Safeguards Agreement now incorporates similar, al-
beit rather more permissive, time limits.' 3 9 In addition, Article
802 mitigates the problem of "side-swiping" which characterizes
the GATT as a result of the principle of non-discrimination. 140
NAFTA exempts from multilateral safeguard action by one
party imports from the other that are not a "substantial share of
total imports,"141 and which do not "contribute importantly to
the serious injury"142 of the importing party. Imports from a
party do not account for a substantial share of total imports if
135. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION 99 (1970).
136. Sykes, supra note 78, at 279.
137. NAFTA, supra note 6.
138. See GATT, supra note 2.
139. See generally Barcel6, supra note 68.
140. See NAFTA, supra note 6.
141. Id. art. 802(1)(a).
142. Id. art. 802(1)(b).
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that party is not among the top five suppliers of the good mea-
sured in terms of import share in the most recent three-year pe-
riod.143 They shall not be considered to contribute importantly
to serious injury if the growth rate of that party's imports is ap-
preciably lower than the growth rate of total imports over the
period of injury.144 Binational panel arbitration can be invoked
in the event of disputes over the proper applications of the safe-
guards regime. 145
An aspect of the regional safeguards regime which might be
addressed is the injury test, which currently focuses on serious
injury to domestic producers. Investors have no compelling nor-
mative claim to protection from the risks which accompany in-
creased trade liberalization. The economic, distributive justice,
and communitarian ethical perspectives, however, all provide
normative justifications for the protection of displaced workers
through some form of policy response. If safeguards are to be
employed to address this concern, it is recommended that a new
definition of "serious injury" be developed, focusing not on "do-
mestic industries" but rather on the trade impacts which accrue
to those employed by such industries. If this definition of injury
is adopted, invocation of the safeguards regime should extend
beyond cases of injury caused by prior trade concessions to any
case where trade impacts cause or are likely to cause serious
injury to domestic workers. Implicit in the proposal is that the
safeguard regime under NAFTA should be permanent and not
limited to the transitional period for implementation of tariff
concessions. In order to facilitate the adoption of alternative
forms of longer-term adjustment assistance, safeguard relief
should be confined to tariffs, as under NAFTA, 146 or auctioned
quotas, rather than other forms of quantitative restrictions.
This restriction on safeguard relief in part would enhance the
transparency of the measures, and in part would provide new
sources of revenue out of which to finance worker adjustment
programs.
Other aspects of the current bilateral and multilateral safe-
guards regime in need of reform are the requirement that com-
pensation be paid in the form of new trade concessions of
equivalent value, and the permissibility of retaliation in the ab-
sence of compensation. The Uruguay Round Safeguards Agree-
143. Id. art. 802(2)(a).
144. Id. art. 802(2)(b).
145. Id. art. 803(2).
146. Id. art. 801(1).
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ment retains the obligation to compensate, but if the safeguard
measure lasts less than three years, the right of exporting coun-
tries to suspend concessions of equivalent value is withheld. 147
Where legitimate safeguard actions are taken in accordance
with the conditions outlined above, it is not clear why compensa-
tion should be required or retaliation allowed. The role of the
safeguards regime is the provision of a limited form of risk shar-
ing in the event of unforeseeably disruptive import surges, a role
which is analogous to the doctrine of frustration or impossibility
in domestic contract law. Such a view of the role of safeguards is
consistent with the concept of safeguards as a means of encour-
aging greater trade liberalization by reducing the risks associ-
ated therewith. 148
Access to safeguard protection should also be subject to the
proviso that less trade restrictive forms of adequate adjustment
assistance are not available. The protection of workers, a legiti-
mate concern from various ethical perspectives, should be at-
tained through the least costly and least trade distorting policy.
Such a proviso would put the onus on the government to tailor
assistance to the needs of those who deserve it. Often the best
solution is worker adjustment assistance, in that it facilitates
the movement of labor to its higher valued use while at the same
time satisfying distributive justice and communitarian
concerns. 14
9
For example, even in small communities dependent on a
single firm or industry, a careful mix of policy instruments could
often be crafted to be less distortive of allocative efficiency and
less prejudicial to consumer welfare than trade protection. Fa-
cilitating conversion of a physical plant to other uses, assisting
worker buyouts, early retirement packages for older workers,
plant-closing laws, and relocation and retraining assistance for
younger workers can provide a principled response to communi-
tarian and distributive justice concerns.
In contrast, safeguard measures may harm the workers in
assisted industries, for example, in cases where the protected
firm seeks to achieve rationalization and improved productivity
through the substitution of capital for labor. In addition, safe-
guards may adversely affect other domestic industries and their
workers where those industries import lower priced inputs from
foreign producers and would face higher prices as a result of the
147. Barcel6, supra note 68, at 784.
148. See DAM, supra note 135; Sykes, supra note 60.
149. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 95.
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safeguard measure. Thus, safeguards should only be resorted to
in cases where adequate domestic adjustment assistance pro-
grams cannot be designed to offset, at lower cost, the adjustment
costs borne by workers in affected industries.
Finally, the provision of safeguards relief should no longer
be a matter of political discretion. Where the conditions out-
lined in this section have been met, we recommend that safe-
guards relief be available as a matter of right, following
appropriate administrative determinations.
IV. TRILATERAL IMPLICATIONS
Our main focus has been a discussion and analysis of the
trade remedy law regime in Canada and the United States, and
the presentation of a framework for reform. Any discussion of
the trade remedy law regime in North America would be incom-
plete, however, without more thoroughly addressing the implica-
tions of the inclusion of Mexico in the free trade area under
NAFTA.
A. MEXICAN HISTORY, TRADITION, LAws AND INSTITUTIONS
During most of the twentieth century, the role of govern-
ment and the approach to trade in Mexico have not paralleled
the experience in Canada and the United States. Rather, Mexi-
can governments assumed a central role in economic regulation,
and in trade matters tended to pursue import substitution poli-
cies to promote domestic industries by protecting them from for-
eign competition.150 While these policies generated some degree
of industrialization, the protected industries which developed
typically lacked the incentive to become efficient.
The goal of developing a strong industrial base has now led
to a rejection of the protectionist policies of the past and the pur-
suit of increased trade liberalization. The process of change be-
gan in 1983 with the implementation of changes to tariff, import
license, and official import price policies.15 ' One of the major
aspects of this process was Mexico's accession to the GATT in
August 1986.152 Currently, the Mexican government recognizes
150. Rudy Sandoval, Mexico's Path Towards the Free Trade Agreement with
the U.S., 23 INTER-AM. L. REV. 133, 134 (1991).
151. Richard G. Lipsey, The Case for Trilateralism, in CONTINENTAL Ac-
CORD: NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 165 (Steven Globerman ed.,
1991).
152. GATT, Protocol for the Accession of Mexico to the GATT, 33rd Supp.
BISD 3 (1987).
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the importance of international trade to the country's future eco-
nomic growth and prosperity.153
In the context of trade remedy laws, Mexico has enacted
ADD and CVD regimes with basic similarities to the United
States and Canadian regimes.15 4 This follows from the fact that
GATT membership requires Mexican ADD and CVD laws to be
in conformity with the same GATT requirements that provide
the basis for the Canadian and U.S. regimes. Certain aspects of
the Mexican regime, however, differ significantly from the Cana-
dian and American regimes. To a large extent, NAFTA ad-
dresses this problem through required amendments to Mexico's
trade remedy law regime, which Mexico must implement in or-
der to enhance procedural fairness.' 55
Even where ADD and CVD laws are similar, this does not
ensure their application in a manner consistent with adminis-
trative practices in the United States and Canada. This regime
has existed in Mexico for less than a decade, and Mexican law-
yers and economists have little experience in the application of
such laws in a market-based economy. Given that the Mexican
economic perspective is shaped by a long history of government
control, attitudes with regard to issues such as government sub-
sidization are likely to differ substantially from those that pre-
vail in Canada and particularly the United States. 156
The Mexican approach to competition law provides more ev-
idence of differing national traditions. Under Article 1501 of
NAFTA, each country commits itself to adopt or maintain effec-
tive competition laws.' 57 While both Canada and the United
States have a long history of fostering the competitive process
through antitrust laws, Mexico has only in the past year enacted
its first comprehensive competition law. Mexican market struc-
153. Sandoval, supra note 150, at 135.
154. THOMAS M. BODDEZ & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, UNFINISHED BusINEss:
REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN NORTH AMERICA 265-66 (1993). Between
1980 and 1990, 18 of the 27 CVD actions initiated by the United States against
Mexico resulted in positive final determinations. Over the same period, 4 of the
8 ADD actions initiated by the United States against Mexico resulted in posi-
tive final determinations. Between 1980 and 1990, Mexico initiated no CVD
actions against the United States. Over the same period, 6 of the 14 ADD ac-
tions initiated by Mexico against the United States resulted in positive final
determinations. The Mexican trade remedy regime has never been applied to
Canadian products. Canada has initiated only one ADD action, and no CVD
actions, against Mexican products. Id.
155. NAFTA, supra note 6, Annex 1904.15 (Schedule of Mexico).
156. PETER MORICI, NATIONAL PLANNING ASS'N COMM. ON CHANGING INT'L
REALITIES, TRADE TALKS WITH MExIco: A TIME FOR REALSM 74 (1991).
157. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1501(1).
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ture has been premised on government control and regulation of
the economy. A number of major Mexican industries are con-
trolled by government-sanctioned monopolies and duopolies. 158
This has important implications for any reform of ADD law
which is premised on the substitution of competition law
principles.
B. BILATERAL REFORM PROPOSALS IN THE TRILATERAL
CONTEXT
An important feature of our proposals is the replacement of
ADD law with domestic competition law. In particular, the
predatory pricing provisions in each country would be applied
against foreign exporters. The main problem confronting the
implementation of such a proposal in the trilateral context is the
absence of any antitrust tradition in Mexico. Within Canada
and the United States, similar legislative approaches have been
adopted, making the extra-territorial application of foreign com-
petition law to domestic industries a matter which is within the
realm of political feasibility.' 5 9 It may be, however, that neither
Canada nor the United States would be willing to replace ADD
law without some significant body of credible experience devel-
oping under the new Mexican competition law, especially with
respect to predatory pricing and abuse of dominant position.
Concerns over the implementation of this law could have been
partially alleviated if NAFTA had provided for the appeal of do-
mestic antitrust decisions affecting foreign interests to a supra-
national panel, as suggested above in our bilateral proposal. 160
While the replacement of ADD law with antitrust law may not
be politically feasible in a trilateral context, this should not im-
pede continued attempts to secure the bilateral adoption of this
proposal by Canada and the United States, thereby facilitating
the elimination of ADD law between these two countries.
Our proposals also call for removal of the determination of
what constitutes a countervailable subsidy from unilateral con-
trol beyond the prohibited per se category. This determination
would be made by a supra-national institution, such as a Chap-
ter 20 panel under NAFTA, 161 prior to the unilateral application
of CVD law by domestic administrative agencies. This proposal
would appear to be one which is at least as politically acceptable
158. Moaici, supra note 156, at 75.
159. See Warner, supra note 101, at 859-88.
160. See supra text accompanying note 116.
161. NAFTA, supra note 6.
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to Mexico as it is to Canada. Mexico has a vested interest in
reducing the degree to which the United States can unilaterally
countervail Mexican subsidization practices. Where, however,
the supra-national institution is composed of an equal number of
representatives from each country (as Mexico and Canada would
likely demand), at least where the subsidy practice in question
affects all three markets, the United States may have serious
reservations. The possibility of Canadian and Mexican repre-
sentatives joining together to allow certain subsidization prac-
tices that the Americans consider countervailable may be
sufficient to render this proposal politically infeasible to the
United States. The fact that this proposal faces greater barriers
in the trilateral context than it does bilaterally should not act as
a deterrent to its bilateral acceptance and implementation.
We also have proposed the adoption of a permanent safe-
guards regime, the invocation of which would be subject to the
proviso that adequate domestic adjustment assistance programs
are not available to offset labor adjustment costs in a more cost-
effective manner.162 This permanent safeguards regime would
be similar in nature to the temporary regime established in
Chapter 8 of NAFTA. 163 Additional features of this regime
would include the absence of a right to receive compensation or
engage in retaliation when faced with a safeguards action, and
the right to invoke safeguards through appropriate administra-
tive procedures, rather than being subject to political discretion.
The adoption of certain aspects of this proposal in the trilat-
eral context are not contentious. Other aspects of the recom-
mended regime, however, may face more significant political
difficulties in the trilateral context. For example, the require-
ment that more cost-effective domestic adjustment assistance
programs be invoked before the imposition of safeguard meas-
ures may raise greater problems trilaterally than bilaterally in
that the Mexican government may be less able to fund such
programs.
Overall, the addition of Mexico to a North American free
trade area gives rise to some difficulties in reforming trade rem-
edy laws which are not as severe in the bilateral Canada-United
States trading relationship. Political constraints in Mexico may
diminish the feasibility of some of our proposals, as will Cana-
dian and U.S. reservations regarding Mexican laws and institu-
tions. Some of the proposed reforms might still be realized in
162. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 137-45.
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trilateral negotiations. In addition, political infeasibility in a
trilateral context should not be an impediment to the adoption of
our policy proposals in the bilateral context.
V. CONCLUSION
We have sought to present trade remedy reform proposals
which would increase trade liberalization and net social welfare
in Canada and the United States (and potentially Mexico), while
at the same time being sensitive to political realities. The pro-
posals build on familiar institutional structures in a manner
which does not infringe the political sovereignty of either coun-
try to a degree which would clearly be unacceptable. While it
may be excessively optimistic to expect that all of our recommen-
dations will garner the necessary political support in both Can-
ada and the United States, we would hope that at least serious
discussion of these policy options will prove possible in ongoing
trade negotiations between the two countries. In 1988, through
Articles 1906 and 1907 of the FTA, both countries committed
themselves to developing a substitute trade remedy law regime
within five to seven years. Furthermore, under the Agreement,
failing to develop a substitute trade remedy law regime could
lead to termination of the FTA by either party, provided six
months notice is given. 164 This commitment has been partially
revived in a NAFTA side agreement. 165 It is time for both coun-
tries to take this commitment seriously.
164. FTA, supra note 5, art. 1906.
165. See Canadian Government to Implement NAFTA After Receiving Assur-
ances on Concerns, supra note 22.
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